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Abstract
In this paper, the issue of whether willingness to pay (WTP) for the benefits generated
by a public good should be elicited on an individual or a household basis is addressed.
Differences between individual and household WTP may arise when members of the
household are mutually altruistic. It is shown that, for general specifications of altruism,
household WTP is less than the sum of household members’ individual WTP. Implications
or the choice between household and individual measures of WTP are considered, and
issues in the elicitation of household WTP are addressed.
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Individual and Household Willingness to Pay for Public Goods
Introduction
The issue of whether willingness to pay (WTP) for the benefits generated by a
public good should be elicited on an individual or a household basis has long been
recognised as a practical problem in applications of the contingent valuation method
(Mitchell and Carson 1989). The choice between individuals and households as units of
analysis presents difficulties in any study of consumer behavior. Standard welfare and
demand theory is based on individual preferences, and modern theoretical analysis of
household behavior is based on the rejection of the notion that households may be regarded
as unitary decision-makers rather than groups of individuals. (Becker 1976). On the other
hand, practical considerations of data collection normally encourage the use of households
as the unit of analysis.
Further questions arise in the case when the contingent valuation method is used to
elicit passive use or non-use values. Altruistic concern for others is an important element
of passive use value, and altruism between family members is generally considered to be
an important element of the analysis of household choices. The assumptions about altruism
used in any implicit model of the household should be consistent with the assumptions
used in the elicitation and aggregation of measures of WTP.
In this paper, the properties of individual and household measures of WTP for a
public good are compared. It is shown that, for general specifications of altruism, household
WTP is less than the sum of household members’ individual WTP. Two polar cases are
considered. If individuals display paternalistic altruism towards each other, and are con-
cerned only with consumption of the public good, household WTP will be equal to the
sum of household members’ individual WTP. If individuals have well-defined personal
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utility functions but display nonpaternalistic altruism towards each other, it is possible to
define a measure of private WTP which will be less than the individual WTP elicited by
standard contingent valuation questions. It is shown that, in this case, household WTP
will be equal to the sum of private WTP and therefore less than the sum of individual
WTP. The implications of these results for the choice between household and individual
measures of WTP are considered, and issues in the elicitation of household WTP are
addressed.
Model
The formal analysis in this paper is separated into three subsections: notation and
definitions; the formal derivation of the results; and discussion of the way in which the
results may be interpreted.
Notation and definitions
We first consider a household of N individuals. Each individual i consumes an
amount yi of a Hicksian composite private good. The vector of all individual consumption
levels is denoted y,  and the vector consisting of the consumption of all individuals other
than i is denoted y
- i. Total household consumption is 
i
n
=
∑
1
yi. In addition, a vector q of
nonrival goods is consumed by all members of the household. The goods described in q
may be either public goods consumed by the entire community, club goods consumed by
some subset of the community including all members of the household, or household
goods such as central heating, which are public goods for members of the household but
from which nonmembers are excluded.
Each individual has a utility function in the general form ui(yi, y-i, q), nondecreasing
in each of its arguments. We assume that, over the relevant range, there exist no Pareto-
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improving redistributions of the private good. That is, given (y, q), there exists no y1 with
y yi
i
N
i
i
N
1
1 1= =
∑ ∑≤  and ui(y1i, y1-i, q) ‡  ui(yi, y- i, q) "  i, with strict inequality for at least one i.
This assumption may be interpreted as saying that redistributions approved by all members
of the household have been undertaken prior to the determination of the initial (y0, q0) and
that subsequent changes in q and y do not create opportunities for Pareto-improving
redistributions.
Given an initial (y0, q0), and q1 ‡  q0, the compensating variation WTPi(q1) for individual
i associated with a shift from q0 to q1  is implicitly defined by the equality
ui(y0i - WTPi, y0-i, q1) = ui(y0i, y0-i, q0). (1)
This is the same as the standard formula for WTP presented by Mitchell and Carson
(1989), except that the term y0
- i implies that individuals may have altruistic concern
about the consumption levels of other members of the household. WTPi  is the amount
the individual would pay for an increase in q, on the assumption that y
-i  is unchanged.
Next, define a shift from (y0, q0) to (y1, q1) as potentially Pareto-improving if there
exists y2 £  y0 satisfying:
(i) y yi
i
N
i
i
N
2
1
1
1= =
∑ ∑≤  ; and
(ii) ui(y2i, y2-i, q1) ‡  ui(y0i, y0-i, q0) "  i .
For given  q0, q1, condition (i), in conjunction with the assumption of a Pareto-optimal
distribution within the household, implies that the question of whether a shift from (y0,
q0) to (y1, q1) is potentially Pareto-improving depends only on yi
i
N
0
1=
∑  – yi
i
N
1
1=
∑ . This
justifies the definition of WTPPPI(q1), the (Pareto-optimal) household willingness to pay
for a shift from q0 to q1, as
4
WTPPPI(q1) = sup{ yi
i
N
0
1=
∑  – yi
i
N
1
1=
∑ :  (y1, q1) is a potential Pareto-improvement on (y0, q0)}.
This is the maximum payment that members of the household could make, such that all
of them would be better off, taking into account both the change in q and the changes in
general consumption.
From this definition, it is easy to derive:
Lemma: Let y1 be such that yi
i
N
0
1=
∑  – yi
i
N
1
1=
∑  = WTPPPI(q1), and let y2 satisfy the conditions
(i) and (ii) above. Then ui(y2i, y2-i, q1) = ui(y0i, y0-i, q0) "  i.
Proof: Suppose that ui(y2i, y2-i, q1) > ui(y0i, y0-i, q0) for some i. Then there exists y3 < y2
satisfying conditions (i) and (ii) contradicting the definition of  WTPPPI(q1).
Household and individual WTP
The central result of this paper is that whenever some household member i displays
altruism for some other member j, that is, whenever ui is strictly increasing in yj, aggregate
individual WTP exceeds household WTP. The intuition behind the result is straightforward.
In the individual WTP question, each individual is asked to state compensating variation
for a situation in which the quantity of public goods q is increased and y
-i, the consumption
of private goods by all other household members, is left unchanged, implying that all
other household members are better off.
By contrast, the definition of WTPPPI involves a sum over compensating variations
for each household member given that the every other household member incurs a loss of
the private good sufficient to leave utility unchanged.
Result 1: Assume that for at least one pair (i, j), ui is strictly increasing in yj. Then for
any  q1 > q0, 
i
N
=
∑
1
WTPi(q1) > WTPPPI(q1)
Proof: Let y2 be such that ui(y2i, y2-i, q1) = ui(y0i, y0-i, q0) "  i.
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Since u is increasing in its arguments,
ui(y2i, y0-i, q1) ‡  ui(y2i, y2-i, q1) = ui(y0i, y0-i, q0) "  i, with strict inequality for at least one i.
 Hence, WTPi ‡  y0i - y2i "  i, with strict inequality for at least one i.
So,
i
N
=
∑
1
WTPi(q1) > WTPPPI(q1).
The necessary condition for Result 1 is that household members should care about
the consumption of private goods by other household members.  A partial converse to
Result 1 may be obtained for the case where household members display paternalistic
altruism1 with respect to the nonrival good q, but not with respect to general consumption.
That is, household members gain utility from the fact that other members are consuming
q, but not from their general consumption. Then the converse of the argument used for
Result 1 implies:
Result 2: If for all i, ui is independent of all the yj, j „  i, then, for any q1 ‡  q0,
i
N
=
∑
1
WTPi(q1) = WTPPPI(q1).
This result shows that paternalistic altruism with respect to the public good is fully
reflected in both individual and household WTP measures.2
Paternalistic altruism with respect to the public good represents one polar case of
the model. The opposite polar case arises when there exist functions vj(y, q) j = 1, ... N,
and Wi:´ N  fi  ´, such that Wi(v) = ui(yi, y-i, q), " i. This case may be interpreted as one of
nonpaternalistic altruism in which each individual i has a ‘private’ utility function vi(y, q)
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1
 The term ‘paternalistic altruism’ is used here to refer to the idea that the person displaying altruistic cares
about their own beliefs about what is good for the object of their concern, rather than about that person’s
own preferences.
2
 I am indebted to an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
but acts to maximize a ‘household welfare function’ Wi depending on the utility of all
household members. Individuals displaying nonpaternalistic altruism do not value the
consumption of other household members directly, but only as it contributes to the utility
of those household members.
We define WTP*i, the ‘private’ WTP for individual i  associated with a shift from
q0 to q1  as the solution to the equality
vi(y0i - WTP*i,  q1) = vi(y0i, q0). (2)
Our next result shows that, in this case, household WTP is equal to the aggregate
‘private’ WTP. This result arises because the household can always redistribute income
so as to make every member better off, provided that the cost to the household as a whole
of an increase in q is less than the sum of private WTP.
Result 3: Assume that there exist functions vj(y, q) j = 1, ... N, and Wi: ´ N  fi  ´, such
that Wi(v) = ui(yi, y-i, q), " i. Then for any  q1 ‡  q0, 
i
N
=
∑
1
WTP* i(q1) = WTPPPI(q1).
Proof: Define y1, y1i = y0i - WTP*i. Then, for all i ,
 ui(y1i, y1-i, q) = Wi(v1(y01- WTP*1,  q1), ... vN(y0N - WTP*N,  q1))           
= Wi(v1(y01, q0) ... vN(y0N, q0)) = ui(y0i, y0- i, q).
Hence, by definition, WTPPPI(q1) ‡  
i
N
=
∑
1
WTP*i(q1).
Now suppose there exists y2 such that:
(i) y yi
i
N
i
i
N
2
1
1
1= =
∑ ∑< ; and
(ii) ui(y2i, y2-i, q1) ‡  ui(y0i, y0-i, q0) =  ui(y1i, y1-i, q) "  i.
Then there exists y3 >> y2 such that a shift from (y1, q1) to (y3, q1) constitutes a
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Pareto-improving redistribution of the private good, contrary to the assumption that no
such redistribution is feasible.
Hence WTPPPI(q1) £  
i
N
=
∑
1
WTP*i(q1) and the result is proved. 
Finally, observe that if all members of the household are perfectly altruistic, in the
sense that they place an equal weight on the value of their own utility and that of any
other member of the household, then  Wi(v) = 
j =1
N
S
 vj " i. If personal utility vi is linear in
yi, each individual will be willing to pay an amount equal to the WTP of the household as
a whole. This yields:
Corollary 3.1  If all members of the household are perfectly altruistic, and personal
utility vi is linear in yi,
i
N
=
∑
1
WTPi(q1) = N 
i
N
=
∑
1
WTP*i(q1).
The linearity condition of Corollary 3.1 will be approximately satisfied for small
projects, provided preferences are smooth.
The analysis above is unchanged if willingness to accept (WTA) measures are used
in place of WTP. The equivalent variation measure of individual WTA is implicitly
defined by
ui(y0i y0-i, q1) = ui(y0i + WTAi, y0-i, q0), (1*)
and household WTA is defined by
WTAPPI(q1) = inf{ yi
i
N
0
1=
∑  – yi
i
N
1
1=
∑ :  (y0, q0) is a potential Pareto-improvement on (y1, q1)}.
An argument similar to that used for Result 1 establishes:
Result 1*: Assume that for at least one pair (i, j), ui is strictly increasing in yj. Then for
any  q1 £  q0, 
i
N
=
∑
1
WTAi(q1) ‡  WTAPPI(q1).
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Analogous corollaries to Results 2 and 3 may be obtained similarly.
Interpretation
One way of interpreting Results 1 and 3, and particularly Corollary 3.1, is that the
inclusion of altruistic WTP in measures of individual WTP involves a danger of ‘double
counting’. However, the core of the argument is not that benefits are overcounted when
individual WTP is used as the basis for evaluation, but that costs are undercounted, in that
the welfare loss to individual i associated with payments made by other household members
is disregarded in the elicitation of individual WTP. In cases where differential degrees of
altruism are expressed towards different household members, it may be argued that a
form of overweighting is given to the utility of favoured members (Bernheim and Stark
1988), but this is a separate issue and is not addressed here.
We may also consider Result 3 in the light of the discussion by Brookshire, Eubanks
and Sorg (1986) of ‘preferential’ and ‘counterpreferential’ WTP. Brookshire et al. use the
term ‘counterpreferential’ to describe any WTP that arises from a feeling of moral duty
rather than from the satisfaction of personal preferences. They argue that such
counterpreferential WTP should be excluded from consideration in benefit–cost analysis.
For example, if an adult with no children and no interest in education expressed WTP for
schools on the ground that ‘even though it does not benefit me, the community has an
obligation to educate young people’, Brookshire et al. would class this WTP as
counterpreferential and would exclude it from consideration. If the altruistic component
of individual WTP is regarded as counterpreferential, the approach advocated by Brookshire
et al. would eliminate the disparity between household WTP and the sum of individual
WTP.
The choice of benefit estimates
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Having established that household WTP is, in general, less than or equal to the sum
of individual WTP,  it is necessary to consider which is a more appropriate estimate of the
benefits generated by a public good. We begin by considering a number of arguments in
favor of the use of household WTP. In each case, the argument shows that, under appropriate
conditions, provision of a public good will be Pareto-optimal if and only if the cost of
provision of the good is less than household WTP.  Hence, under the stated conditions,
household WTP is the most appropriate measure for use in benefit–cost analysis.
First, if the household chooses to redistribute income so as to achieve a Pareto-
improvement on the original allocation whenever this is possible, an increase in the
supply of the public good from q0 to q1 will be beneficial to the household if and only if
the increase in the cost of provision of the public good is less than household WTP. By
contrast, an increase from q0 to q1 at a cost greater than household WTP but less than
aggregate individual WTP can never be associated with a Pareto-improvement.
Second, consider the case where a household with a capacity for redistribution
makes choices about market goods which are nonrival within the household. Such a
household will unanimously approve the provision of all and only public goods for which
the household WTP is greater than the cost of provision. Aggregating across households
will yield the aggregate market demand for the good.
Third, consider a household made up of identical individuals. Every member of
such a household will favor an increase from q0 to q1 if and only if the required individual
payment is less than WTPPPI(q1)/N.
There are, however, some difficulties with the household WTP approach. Where
households are made up of different individuals and there is limited capacity for redistri-
bution, it cannot be guaranteed that the use of household WTP will lead to Pareto-optimal
outcomes. For example preferences may differ by gender (Swallow et al. 1994), but
redistribution within the household may be limited by gender roles. In these circumstances,
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provision of a public good for which household WTP exceeds the cost of provision may
make some members of the household worse off, and elicitation of individual WTP may
provide relevant information that is lost when the household WTP approach is used.
Elicitation of household WTP
The discussion in the previous section suggest that, in many cases, it will be desirable
to measure household WTP rather than individual WTP.  Most previous discussions of
problems in eliciting WTP have focused on individual WTP. It is, therefore, of interest to
consider how household WTP might be elicited. Three alternative methods of eliciting
household WTP may be considered: the first is to elicit individual values which may be
aggregated to yield household WTP; the second is to treat the household as a unit and
attempt to elicit household WTP directly; and the third is to apply a referendum procedure.
Elicitation of personal utility
The first procedure is to interview a randomly selected member of each household
in the sample population and to elicit WTP contingent on the hypothesis that all other
household members will make a payment sufficient to leave them exactly indifferent
between the implementation of the project and the original position. Under the conditions
of Result 2, this is equivalent to eliciting WTP*i. Assuming that vi represents personal
utility, it may be possible to elicit WTP*i by asking a question of the form ‘What payment
would leave you personally indifferent between q0 and q1, assuming that the welfare of
family members was unchanged’.
The most obvious difficulty with questions of this form is that they refer to a
hypothetical situation that cannot be specified precisely in the absence of knowledge of
the utility functions of all household members. The payment required of other household
members to leave their utility unchanged will, in general, depend on the amount paid by
11
the individual being questioned. This form of question is excessively complicated. Also,
because it refers to an highly artificial situation, the question raises the possibility of
strategic responses.
A more general difficulty with this approach is that it requires the selection of an
appropriately randomized sample of individuals as representatives of households. Yet the
household (that is, the group of people whose consumption enters into a given individual’s
utility function) will frequently include children and may include people who are not yet
born. If personal utility is elicited from a sample that includes only adults, public goods
that benefit children and future generations will be underprovided relative to household
WTP3.
Direct elicitation of household WTP
The second possible procedure is direct elicitation of household WTP. Such direct
elicitation is commonly attempted by using either an open-ended question of the form,
‘How much would your household be willing to pay ...’ or a dichotomous choice asking
the respondent to accept or reject a proposition in which the household would be required
to pay a given amount in return for provision of the public good.
Several difficulties arise here. First, it is normally impractical to interview all house-
hold members and elicit a consensus decision. In practice, it is normal to interview one
household member, possibly, but not always, one identified as the head of the household.
Even if redistribution is possible, this member is likely to estimate the household WTP
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3
 Note that even household WTP is effectively determined by today’s adults since they control the
distribution of y within the households including, via bequests, the amount transferred to future generations.
Thus the treatment of future generations associated with elicitation of household WTP is consistent with
standard benefit–cost practice where the discount rate is determined by the preferences of the current (adult)
generation, including the altruistic elements of u. Critics of benefit–cost analysis frequently argue that this
implies excessive discount rates. A fortiori, this criticism applies to elicitation of personal utility values
from current adults only.
with error. If the member selected for interview is, on average, not representative of the
household, estimates of the household WTP may be biased.
The referendum method
The third possible procedure for eliciting household WTP is based on surrogate
referendum methods. Rather than using a hypothetical payment vehicle, the referendum
method should specify both the good to be provided and the actual payment vehicle under
consideration, for example, an increase in the rate of income tax or property tax. Thus, for
any given tax rate it is possible to identify the payment consequences for each member of
the household. However, the level of the payment vehicle for which a ‘Yes/No’ response
is elicited, for example the increase in the property tax rate, will differ between respondents.
This is the critical feature distinguishing the referendum method from a simple opinion
poll.
Assume that the decision rule when using the referendum method is to provide the
public good if and only if the median voter is in favor when the tax rate is sufficient to
pay for provision of the good. Then, in the case where respondents are self-interested
individuals, the referendum method is incentive-compatible; that is, for any individual,
the optimal response is always to answer truthfully (Zeckhauser 1973).
It is straightforward to establish that this result extends to the case analyzed here.
First, suppose that the household redistributes income to ensure a Pareto-improvement
whenever this is feasible. Then all members of the household will vote in favor of any
proposal for which the aggregate cost to household members is less than household WTP,
and against all other proposals.
Alternatively, suppose that no redistribution is feasible. Given the specified vector
of payments t = (t1, t2 ... tN), standard arguments based on the concept of incentive-
compatibility show that the individual will vote ‘Yes’ if and only if u(y0i – ti, y0-i – t–i, q1)
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‡  u(y0i, y0- i, q0). If 
i
N
=
∑
1
ti £  WTPPPI(q1), this condition must be satisfied for at least one i. If
the net benefits of proposals are uniformly distributed within the household and
i
N
=
∑
1
ti £  WTPPPI(q1), a majority of household members will vote in favor of the proposal.
Two main difficulties arise with the referendum method. The first is the need to
specify the payment vehicle as well as the good to be provided. This difficulty is unavoidable
when altruistic preferences are present. In eliciting individual WTP, it is normally assumed
that rational individuals care only about the amount they pay for provision of a public
good and not about the payment vehicle. The term ‘vehicle’ reflects the idea that the
mode of payment is irrelevant.
The fact that some payment vehicles, when used in contingent valuation studies,
tend to produce inconsistent replies or protest responses is regarded as a problem of
communication rather than a violation of this assumption. Since it is assumed that the
only thing that matters is the amount paid, a payment vehicle may be chosen because it is
familiar to respondents or because it has been designed to minimize protest responses.
However, when altruism is present, individuals will, in general, care about the
amounts paid by others, as well as the amount they themselves pay. For any given
amount paid by one individual the amount paid by others will depend on the choice of
payment vehicle. Hence, individuals may support a proposal if it is financed by, say, a
property tax, but not if it is financed by a user charge, even though the amount they
themselves are asked to pay is independent of the choice of payment vehicle.
A second difficulty with the referendum method is that incentive compatibility is
preserved only by making the median respondent decisive. If benefits are unevenly
distributed, proposals with 
i
N
=
∑
1
ti £  WTPPPI(q1) may be rejected and vice versa. The response
of the median respondent may, however, be treated as a robust estimator of mean WTP
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(Mitchell and Carson 1989).
Conclusion
The choice between individuals and households as units of analysis is often regarded
as a mere technical detail in the implementation of the contingent valuation method. As
has been shown here, however, analysis of the problem reveals issues that go to the heart
of the interpretation of the notion of passive use value and particularly of WTP based on
altruism.
In the absence of altruism, or where altruism is paternalistic and only arises with
respect to consumption of the public good, the choice between eliciting individual and
household WTP is largely a matter of convenience, since both procedures should yield
the same result. In the presence of nonpaternalistic altruism, standard procedures for
eliciting individual WTP will yield aggregate benefit estimates greater than the WTP of
the household as a whole.
This result arises because the standard definition of compensating variation involves
only a partial specification of consequences affecting others; changes in q are included,
but changes in y
–i are not. For most purposes, therefore, it is appropriate to elicit household
rather than individual WTP.
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